active defense and adversarial agents: GCG attacks
Plant optimized GCG adversarial suffixes targeting adversarial agents
Security research, field notes, and practical experiments
Writing
Independent technical notes by Willis Vandevanter, published in reverse chronological order.
Recent writing
active defense and adversarial agents: service sandbagging
in previous posts we have looked at guardrail triggers, token burn, hostname beacons, malicious skills, context bombs, exploding search space, and GCG attacks. this time: service sandbagging.
active defense is planting traps that force an agent to reveal …
active defense and adversarial agents: context bombs
Tracebit's context bombs plant guardrail-triggering text in canary secrets so AI attackers refuse mid-run.
active defense and adversarial agents: exploding search space (academic)
in previous posts we have been looking at different active defense approaches: guardrail triggers, token burn, hostname beacon, malicious skills, context bombs, service sandbagging, and GCG attacks. I want to explore one I recently read in an academic paper. …
active defense and adversarial agents: malicious skills
in the previous post we looked at hostname beacons. this time: malicious skills.
active defense is the practice of planting traps that force an agent to reveal itself or change the economics of its operation.
skills are a high-signal trap because they are …
active defense and adversarial agents: hostname beacon
in the previous post we opined on token burns in active defense, this time we will consider hostname beacons.
first, active defense is the practice of placing traps that force an attacker or automated agent to reveal itself or interrupt its own workflow rather …
active defense and adversarial agents: token burn
sticking with the theme of applied active defense (previous post), I wanted to explore token burn (lots of names here; unbounded consumption
active defense and adversarial agents: guardrail triggers
the previous post briefly touched on active defense in the scope of AI agents and LLMs. active defense is the practice of placing traps and tripwires that force an attacker (or an automated agent) to reveal itself or interrupt its own workflow rather than …
rethinking threat models when the cost is tokens not time
another by-product of anatomy of a frontier lab agent intrusion: a technical timeline of the july 2026 incident is that the adversary …
Bespoke C2 - LLM era
After reading the most recent hugging face incident report (Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Technical Timeline of the July …